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Abstract— Errors in traceability can significantly 
impact the moral hazard associated with producing safe 
food.  The effect of moral hazard depends on the 
proportion of unsafe food costs that can be allocated to 
the responsible producer, which depends on the 
efficiency of the traceability system.  In this paper, we 
develop a model that identifies the minimum level of 
traceability needed to mitigate moral hazard and 
motivate suppliers to produce safe food.  Regulators and 
consumer can use the results of this research to design 
regulations and contracts that mitigate moral hazard 
and motivate producers to deliver safe food.  
Keywords— Food safety, traceability, moral hazard. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Moral hazard is the effect of insulation from risk on 
the behaviour of individuals and organizations.  In 
food supply chains, producers are often insulated from 
the economic risks of producing unsafe food.  These 
risks include the social and personal cost of food-
borne illnesses and the loss of trust in the food system.  
When producers are insulated from the risk of unsafe 
food, they have less of an incentive to produce safe 
food.  Exposing producers to the risk of unsafe food 
mitigates the moral hazard, motivates suppliers to 
work harder to produce safe food, and increases the 
safety of the food supply.  
One of the essential prerequisites to mitigating 
moral hazard is an efficient traceability system.  A 
traceability system collects and maintains information 
about the origin of a food product.  An efficient 
traceability system is one in which the source of 
unsafe food can be quickly and accurately identified.  
Inefficient traceability systems exhibit significant error 
in the identification of the supplier responsible for 
unsafe food (“traceback error”).  Traceback error is 
common in the food supply chain because food is 
often comingled during production and consumption,  
and because illnesses often occur several days after the 
victim consumes the food.  
In this paper, we develop a model that incorporates 
sampling error, diagnostic error, and traceback error 
into a measure of the producer’s utility from 
producing safe and unsafe food.  We use the model to 
identify the maximum level of traceback error that will 
mitigate moral hazard and motivate producers to 
deliver safe food.  We also identify the conditions 
under which the traceability system has no effect on 
the behaviour of suppliers.   Our results suggest that 
efforts directed toward reducing errors in sampling 
and traceback and subsidizing safe production 
practices are likely to have the greatest impact on the 
safety of the food supply. 
 
II. MORAL HAZARD & THE COST OF UNSAFE 
FOOD 
A. Moral hazard 
Insulation from risk, commonly called moral 
hazard, can have a significant effect on behaviour.   
The concept of moral hazard developed in the 
insurance industry where companies noticed that 
people who are insured behave differently than 
individuals who are not insured.  For example, the 
existence of deposit insurance has been shown to 
affect the behaviour of bank managers [1] and the 
existence of reinsurance markets has been shown to 
influence the behaviour of insurance companies 
themselves [2].   
In economics, principal-agent models are often used 
to represent economic relationships that exhibit moral 
hazard.  In these models, the principal’s payoff 
depends on the behaviour of the agent, but the 
principal cannot observe the agent’s behaviour – only 
the outcome.  The agent decides whether to shirk or to 
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exert the effort that maximizes the principal’s 
objective.  The moral hazard arises because the agent 
prefers to exert less effort, but the principal wants the 
agent to work harder.  
In the food supply chain, the economic relationship 
between suppliers and buyers exhibits moral hazard 
because there are may food attributes that are difficult 
for buyers to evaluate.  Buyers cannot see whether or 
not a food product was grown under organic 
conditions, for example, or whether or not a product is 
contaminated.  The buyer must rely on the supplier to 
exert the effort required to make sure food is 
uncontaminated.  Suppliers who are insulated from the 
risk of unsafe food will be tempted to shirk their 
responsibility to provide safe food.   
B. Mitigating Moral Hazard and Traceability 
Multiple mechanisms have evolved to mitigate 
moral hazard in the food supply chain.  For example, 
third-party certifications are often used to ensure that 
suppliers are providing hidden food attributes.   
Organic production and some kinds of ISO 
certifications fall into this category.  Product 
guarantees and performance bonds are other 
mechanisms for mitigating moral hazard.   
The best way to mitigate moral hazard, however, is 
to expose the supplier to the costs of unsafe food.   
Mechanisms that expose the producer to the cost of 
unsafe food are difficult to implement because they 
require that the producer of the unsafe food is 
identifiable and can be made to pay the cost of unsafe 
food.  In order for a supplier to be identifiable, the 
source of the food must be traceable.   
Traceability is the ability to trace a product and its 
attributes through the supply chain [3].  Traceability 
systems can be classified by breadth, depth, and the 
precision of the information that is collected and 
distributed.  The amount of information that moves 
along the supply chain with a product is called the 
breadth.  This information could include when the 
product was harvested, where it was grown, what 
inputs were used in the production process, etc.  The 
depth of the traceability system refers to how far along 
the supply chain information is retained.  The length 
of the supply chain can be measured by the number of 
processing stages and by the number of days or weeks 
since harvest.  Finally, the quality of the information 
in the traceability system is the precision of the 
system.  More precise information comes from smaller 
tracking units (lots), more accurate sampling 
procedures, and better diagnostic methods. 
Traceability systems have several functions related 
to food safety [4].  First, traceability systems allow the 
impact of a food safety failure to be controlled.  If the 
source of unsafe food can be identified, the food can 
be recalled and removed from the market before the 
costs escalate.  Second, traceability systems allow for 
verification of quality attributes.  As the product 
moves along the supply chain, information is collected 
and is available to potential buyers.  Finally, 
traceability systems allow the cost of unsafe food to be 
allocated to the individual or firm responsible for the 
failure.  This last function of traceability system has 
the greatest impact on mitigating moral hazard and 
providing an incentive to exert the effort needed to 
produce safe food. 
 
C. Food Safety Events that Generate Cost 
Unsafe food causes a number of different kinds of 
costly events.  Some of these costs are paid by the 
supplier, some are paid by the consumer, and some are 
paid by all the suppliers in the industry.  We identify 
three categories of unsafe food costs: test failure costs, 
direct failure costs, and indirect failure costs. 
The cost of pulling a contaminated lot out of the 
supply chain before it moves to the next stage is called 
test failure cost.  The magnitude of test failure cost 
depends on the disposition of the contaminated lot.   
The test failure cost is larger if a contaminated lot is 
scrapped and smaller if the contaminated lot is sold in 
a secondary market where safety is less of an issue 
(like pet food). 
If a contaminated lot passes inspection, reaches 
consumers, and causes an illness, it generates a direct 
failure or indirect failure cost.  When the contaminated 
lot can be traced to the responsible producer, the 
producer pays a direct failure cost.  When the 
contaminated lot cannot be traced to the responsible 
producer, all producers in the industry pay an indirect 
failure cost 
Direct failure costs can be significant. The producer 
may be held liable for the cost of the illnesses, be 
required to recall all potentially contaminated food, 
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and be fined by government agencies if shown to be 
negligent.  Indirect failure costs can also be 
significant, but they are often shared by many firms in 
the industry.  Indirect costs include lost sales, equity 
erosion, and loss of goodwill.  For example, the source 
of the recent outbreak of Salmonella in the United 
States could not be identified for many months.   
Before the contamination was attributed to fresh 
Jalapeno peppers from Mexico, the government 
incorrectly identified tomatoes as a possible culprit.   
U.S. tomato producers faced massive losses even 
though the source of the contamination was eventually 
identified as jalapeño peppers grown in Mexico. 
The magnitude of unsafe food costs depends on 
whether the food causes an outbreak of illness and 
how many people become ill.  In the US, Buzby et al 
[5] showed that even when the producer is identified, 
the actual direct cost to the producer is rarely 
significant.  The producer’s insulation from the 
Figure 1 depicts the events that lead to test failu
external failure cost is an example of moral hazard. 
re 
costs, direct failure costs, and indirect failure costs.  In 
the figure, nodes represent random events that 
influence the final cost to the unsafe food producer, 
which is represented by the final square node.  The 
end node labelled “no cost” means that the producer 
does not pay any extra costs because of the unsafe 
food.  The end node labelled “Test failure” means that 
the lot failed the safety test and did not move past that 
point in the supply chain.  The end node labelled 
“Direct failure” means that the contaminated lot 
caused an illness and the origin of the lot can be traced 
to the producer.  Finally, the end node labelled 
“Indirect failure” represents the not uncommon case in 
which a contaminated lot causes an illness but the 
origin of the lot cannot be identified. 























Figure 1.  Events Leading to Unsafe Food Costs in the Supply Chain. 
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III. EXPECTED COSTS & ECONOMIC INCENTIVES 
In the preceding section, we identified a number of 
different unsafe food events that generate costs.  Of 
course, producers don’t know which series of events 
will occur and so they make decisions based on 
expected cost.  Expected cost, and the producer’s 
expected utility, depends on the magnitude of the cost 
and the probability that the cost occurs. 
A. The Probability of Unsafe Food Costs 
The random events depicted in Figure 1 have 
quantifiable probabilities that depend on the errors in 
sampling, diagnosis, and traceback, and on the 
probability that unsafe food results in an illness.   Of 
the three errors, diagnostic error is the best understood 
and most thoroughly studied.  Sampling error and 
traceback error are poorly understood in the food 
supply chain. 
Sampling error refers to the probability that a 
sample does not represent the characteristics of a lot.  
For example, if an uncontaminated sample is drawn 
from a contaminated lot, then a sampling error has 
occurred. (In this analysis we assume that it is 
impossible to draw a contaminated sample from an 
uncontaminated lot.)  Sampling error is well-defined 
for many kinds of experiments, but it is poorly 
defined, and rarely studied, in the analysis of food 
safety.  We define ε as the probability that a sample is 
uncontaminated given a lot is contaminated. 
Diagnostic error refers to the probability that a test 
for contamination provides an incorrect result.  There 
are two types of diagnostic error: false-positive and 
false-negative.  A false-positive error shows 
contamination when a sample is uncontaminated and a 
false-negative error shows no contamination when a 
sample is contaminated.  False-positive errors mean 
that safe food is unjustly condemned and false-
negative errors mean that unsafe food moves along the 
supply chain.  We define α as the probability that at 
test shows no contamination given a sample is 
contaminated and β as the probability that a test shows 
contamination given a sample is uncontaminated.  
Traceback error refers to the probability that unsafe 
food that causes an illness cannot be traced to the 
responsible producer.  Traceability systems in the US 
are poorly developed and the source of most food 
borne illnesses is never identified.  When the source is 
successfully identified, it may take weeks or months 
for government agents to identify the producer 
responsible for the contaminated food.  We define γ as 
the probability that the source of a contaminated lot 
that causes an illness cannot be traced to its source. 
The relationship between these error rates and the 
costly events depicted in Figure 1 are shown in Table 
1.  Each of the error rates is assumed to be 
independent of the others.  For simplicity, we assume 
that every contaminated lot that passes the safety test 
results in an illness (in reality, of course, many 
contaminated products never cause an illness).   
 
Table 1.  Error rates and the probability of costly 
food safety events. 
 
Event Probability 
Contaminated lot  q 
Uncontaminated lot  1-q 
Error rates 
 
Sampling error  ε 
False-negative error  α 
False-positive error  β 
Traceback error  γ 
Food Safety Events 
 
No cost (nc)  (1 )(1 ) q β −−  
Test failure (tf)  (1 ) (1 )(1 ) qq q β βε α ε −+ +− −  
Direct failure (df)  [(1 ) (1 ) ] qq γ βε α ε −+ −  
Indirect failure (if)  (1 )[(1 ) (1 ) ] qq γ βε α ε −− + −  
 
  In Table 1, we can see that the probability that the 
producer incurs “No cost” is the product of the 
probability that a test shows no contamination when 
the lot is uncontaminated (the test specificity = 1-β) 
and the probability that a lot is uncontaminated (1-q).  
It is interesting to note that the probability of no cost is 
independent of the sampling and traceback errors. 
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B. The Risk of Illness 
From a public safety perspective, one of the most 
important risks is the risk that an unsafe lot passes the 
safety test and causes an illness.   If we assume that all 
contaminated lots that pass inspection cause an illness, 
then the risk of illness is the sum of  the probability 
that a contaminated sample drawn from a 
contaminated lot is evaluated correctly, and the 
probability that an uncontaminated sample drawn from 
a contaminated lot is evaluated incorrectly.  The 
probability that a contaminated lot causes an illness is, 
therefore: 
  
  (1 ) (1 ) δ εβ ε =−+ − α  (1) 
 
It is important to note that this probability depends 
on the sampling error, which depends on sampling 
frequency, sample size, and collection methods.  In 
most food supply chains, the sampling error is poorly 
understood, and rarely studied. 
 
C. Moral Hazard and the Incentive Restriction 
The evaluation of moral hazard in a commercial 
transaction involves defining utility functions for a 
buyer (principal) and for a supplier (agent).  The agent 
selects an effort level that maximizes her utility, the 
agent’s effort results in an outcome that impacts the 
principal’s utility, and the principal prefers outcomes 
from higher effort.  The agent experiences a disutility 
from working harder and is, therefore, motivated to 
shirk.  The goal of the solving this kind of problem is 
to identify a contract, defined as a transfer payment 
from the principal to agent, which will motivate the 
agent to work harder. 
One of the first steps in evaluating the moral hazard 
in a commercial transaction is defining the 
participation constraint and the incentive compatibility 
constraint.  The participation constraint (also called 
the individual rationality condition) defines the 
conditions under which an agent will be willing to 
supply the principal.  In order to be willing, the agent 
must be able to earn more than some minimum level 
of utility.  In most analyses, the minimum is set to zero 
for simplicity. 
The second constraint, the incentive compatibility 
constraint (also called the incentive restriction), 
ensures that the agent maximizes utility.  An agent 
won’t select higher levels of effort unless it optimizes 
the agent’s utility.  The challenge is to link the agent’s 
effort to the agent’s payoff in a way that is consistent 
with the principal’s preferences.  Macho-Stadler and 
Perez-Castrillo [6] provide and excellent introduction 
to the moral hazard problem and the definition of these 
constraints.  Their analysis confirms the importance of 
the individual rationality condition and the incentive 
restriction.  In cases where information is symmetrical, 
the individual rationality condition defines the 
principal’s optimal policy, but when information is 
asymmetrical, the incentive restriction defines the best 
course of action for the principal. 
 
D. Incentive Compatibility and Traceback Error 
We restrict our analysis to the effect of traceback 
error on the incentive compatibility constraint.  We 
know that information is asymmetrical and that the 
principal will strive to find a contract that will induce 
the agent to exert high effort.  Our questions are 
related to how traceability – as represented by 
traceback error – influences the feasibility of 
motivating suppliers to deliver safe lots instead of 
unsafe lots.  In other words, how does traceability 
influence the principal’s ability to mitigate the 
supplier’s moral hazard. 
We begin the analysis by defining the agent’s 
expected utility function.  We assume that the 
contamination rate is a function of effort and that the 
agent is risk neutral.  Under these assumptions, the 
agent’s decision variable becomes the contamination 




[ () ] () ()
                     ( )( )




EU q p qw p qC
pq C w






In (2),  nc p ,  tf p ,  df p , and  if p  represent the 
probabilities of the “No cost,” “Test failure,” “Direct 
failure,” and “Inspection failure” events, respectively, 
12
th Congress of the European Association of Agricultural Economists – EAAE 2008   6 
described in Figure 1.  These event probabilities are 
defined in Table 1 and are, of course, a function of the 
contamination rate q.  The costs  ,  , and   
represent the cost of the test failure, direct failure, and 
indirect failure events.  The transfer payment from the 
principal,  w, is exogenous for the purposes of this 
analysis.  We assume, perhaps optimistically, that the 
supplier knows the cost of producing lots C(q) with 
the selected contamination rate q.  
tf C df C if C
In the case where the contamination rate and the 
effort are continuous, the incentive restriction is: 
 




qA r g E U q ∈  (3) 
 
In other words, for a given transfer from the principal 
(w) and given costs and probabilities for test failure, 
direct failure, and inspection failure, the supplier will 
select a contamination rate that maximizes the 
supplier’s utility function. When effort and 
contamination rate are continuous, however, the 
evaluation of incentive restrictions becomes complex 
and, for most analyses, unmanageable [6].   
  In the interest of analytical tractability, we assume 
that the supplier is choosing between only two levels 
of effort, low and high.  When a supplier exerts high 
effort, the contamination rate of the supplier’s lots is 
relatively low and when the supplier exerts low effort, 
the contamination rate of the supplier’s lots is 
relatively high.  We define  as the low 
contamination rate generated by high effort and 
L q
H q as 
the high contamination rate generated by low effort.   
Producing low contamination rate lots costs 
()
L Cq and producing high contamination rate lots 





LH Cq Cq >
H ⎤ ⎦
  Under these assumptions, the incentive restriction 
becomes: 
 
   (4)  () ()
L EUq EUq ⎡⎤ ⎡ ≥ ⎣⎦ ⎣
 
The agent’s expected utility at low contamination 
should be higher than the expected utility at high 
contamination. 
  The questions that naturally arise are when is 
condition (4) true?  How does traceback error affect 
condition (4)?  When is condition (4) always true and 
when is condition (4) never true?  When condition (4) 
is always true, then high contamination will never be 
selected by the supplier and when condition (4) is 
never true, then low contamination will never be 
selected by the supplier. 
 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE INCENTIVE 
COMPATIBILITY CONSTRAINT 
 
In the last section we developed a model that relates 
the contamination rate to the supplier’s risk neutral 
utility.  In this section, we use this model to analyze 
the connection between the effectiveness of the 
traceability system to the mitigation of the agent’s 
moral hazard.  The effectiveness of the traceability 
system is measured by the traceback error. 
A. Traceback Error and Expected Utility 
We can uncover the relationship between traceback 
error and expected utility by substituting (2) into 




                                   ( )
                              
()
                                    ( )
LL L




nc tf tf df df
H H
if if
pw pC p C w
p Cw C









where superscripts indicate the argument is either   
or 
L q
H q . The no cost and test failure events are 
independent of the traceback error, but the direct 
failure and indirect failure events depend on traceback.  
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Equation (6) identifies the maximum level of 
traceback error that is consistent with the incentive 
restriction.  In other words, if (6) is true, then the 
supplier will elect to exert the effort to produce low 
contamination product and if  (6) is not true, then the 
supplier will elect to deliver high contamination 
product. 
Figure 2 illustrates the impact of traceback error on 
the incentive restriction.  (The parameter values shown 
in Table 2 were used in the developing the Figure 2.)  
Figure 2 shows that the expected utility functions at 
low contamination and high contamination can 
intersect.  The traceback error at which the two lines 
cross is defined by the LHS of (6).  To the right of the 
intersection, the supplier will elect to deliver the 
higher level of contamination, because the traceback 
error insulates the supplier from the risk of illness 
caused by the contamination.  To the left of the 
intersection, the supplier will elect to deliver the lower 
level of contamination, because the traceback error is 
too low to insulate the supplier from the cost of unsafe 
food. 
Figure 2 shows the intersection of the two expected 
utility lines, however, it is possible that the two lines 
never intersect.  Under certain conditions low 
contamination always generates more utility that high 
contamination and under other conditions high 













Figure 2. The Relationship between Traceback Error and Expected Utility  8 
contamination.  In the next section we identify these 
conditions. 
B. Irrelevant Traceback 
It is possible that the effectiveness of the 
traceability system has no effect on the expected 
utility of the agent.  This occurs when the expected 
utility of low contamination is greater than the 
expected utility of high contamination, or vice versa, 
for all possible values of the traceback error, γ. 
Regardless of the traceback error, low 
contamination will never generate more expected 
utility than high contamination when the LHS of (6) is 
less than or equal to 0.  The LHS of (6) is less than or 
equal to 0 when  , i.e. direct failure is not as 
costly as indirect failure (an unlikely occurrence) or 
when: 




               ( )( ) ( )
LH L H
nc nc tf tf tf
H LL
df
pp w pp C
qq CwCC δ
−− −
+− − ≤ −
H  (7) 
 
The LHS of (7) is the incremental expected utility of 
the transfer payments, test failure costs, and direct 
failure costs associated with reducing the 
contamination rate.  The RHS of (7) is the incremental 
increase in the production cost.  Condition (7) implies 
that the benefit of the reduction in the contamination 
rate is less than the production cost increase, and so 
the agent should not exert the effort to make the food 
safer. 
  We can perform a similar analysis to identify the 
conditions under which low contamination is always 
better for the agent, regardless of the traceability 
system.  This is the case when the LHS of (6) is 
greater than or equal to 1.  The LHS of (6) is greater 
than or equal to 1 when: 
 
() ()
               ( )( ) ( )
LH L H
nc nc tf tf tf
H LL
if
pp w pp C
qq CwCC δ
−− −
+− − ≥ −
H (8) 
 
The difference between conditions (7) and (8), besides 
the inequality, is the third term on the LHS.  Condition 
(7) depends on the cost of direct failure and in 
condition (8) depends on the cost of indirect failure.  
Condition (7) implies that if the cost of direct failure is 
very low, then it doesn’t matter what the traceability 
level is, because being identified as the source will not 
be very costly.   Similarly, condition (8) implies that if 
the indirect failure cost is high, it does not really 
matter what the traceback error is, because the agent is 
paying a significant cost even though she is never 
identified as the source of the unsafe food.  
  The analysis in this section provides guidance to 
regulators and consumers (principals) who are trying 
to develop supply chains in which agents are 
motivated to produce low contamination product. 
 
Table 2. Parameter values used in the development 




dependent Parameters  Symbol  Value 
Low contamination rate  q
L 0.5% 















   
Sampling error  ε  50% 
False-negative error  α  0.5% 
False-positive error  β  2.0% 
Transfers & Costs 
  
Transfer from principal  w  1.00 
Test failure 
tf C   0.10 
Direct failure  df C   10.0 
Indirect failure 
if C   2.00 
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C. Paying to Mitigate Moral Hazard 
The agent’s expected utility is influenced by the 
parameters listed in Table 2.  The principal has direct 
control over the transfer payment, w.  How much does 
the principal have to pay to mitigate moral hazard and 
make low contamination the optimal policy for the 
agent?  We can answer this question by rearranging 

























  In (9), the RHS represents the minimum transfer 
payment needed to mitigate moral hazard in the 
presence of traceback error when the incentive 
compatibility constraint is binding.  We define wic as 
the RHS of (9) 
  When traceback error is 100%, wic is at its 
maximum and when traceback error is 0%, wic is at its 
minimum.  For example, using the parameter values in 
Table 2, and assuming the traceback error is 100%, the 
principal will need to pay wic = 4.72 to mitigate moral 
hazard in the supply chain.  As the traceback error 
declines, the minimum transfer also declines.   
  At some point the incentive compatibility 
constraint ceases to become active and the 
participation constraint becomes binding.  When wic 
reaches 0, any transfer payment from the principal will 
satisfy the agent’s incentive restriction.  However, the 
participation constraint will become active before that 
happens.  If we assume that the minimum expected 
utility for agent participation is 0, and rearrange (2) for 
q




tf tf df df if if
LLL
nc df if








So the transfer price that satisfies the incentive 
compatibility AND the participation constraint is the 
maximum of wic and the RHS of (10), which we 
denote wpc.  More formally: 
 
   (11)  min max{ , } ic pc ww =
 
  We can think of the amount by which wic exceeds 
wmin as the traceback inefficiency premium, τ.  Or, 
 
  max{0, } ic pc ww τ = −  (12) 
The traceback inefficiency premium represents the 
amount that the principal must pay the agent to 
mitigate moral hazard because of the inefficiency in 
the traceability system.     
V. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
In the preceding section, we identified the 
conditions under which low contamination satisfies 
the agent’s incentive restriction.  The principal can 
design a contract that mitigates the moral hazard 
inherent to the transaction if the principal can motivate 
the agent to produce safer food.  We also identified the 
conditions under which the agent’s incentive 
restriction will never be satisfied and the conditions 
under with the incentive restriction are always 
satisfied. 
Regulators and buyers can use this information to 
develop terms of trade that mitigate moral hazard 
associated with unsafe food.  The error rates, unsafe 
food costs, production costs and transfer payment all 
influence the existence of moral hazard.  Some of 
these parameters are easier to manipulate than others 
in the effort to increase the utility of producing safer 
food.  Below we discuss several of these parameters 
and the potential for creating a supply chain in which 
low contamination is optimal. 
Error rates.  Advances in testing technology have 
reduced diagnostic errors to almost zero.  For 
example, false-positive and false-negative errors for 
the Dupont BAX system used to test for E. coli in 
ground beef were found to be negligible in 
independent tests [7].  Sampling error and, of course, 
traceback error could be quite a bit larger than 
diagnostic error.  No studies designed to estimate these 
errors have been performed in the US.  Since 
diagnostic error is already close to 0, there is 
significant potential to manipulate the terms of trade 
by reducing traceback and sampling error.  Many 
private food service companies in the US have already 
begun to control traceback error by limiting the  w
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number of suppliers and requiring suppliers to be 
certified for safety and quality. 
Unsafe food costs.  Some of the unsafe food costs 
described above can be controlled by the buyer and 
some cannot.  The cost of test failure is, for the most 
part, outside the control of the buyer.  Scrap costs and 
salvage values are, for the most part, driven by market 
conditions and are not controllable.  Direct failure 
costs have more potential for control.  Direct failure 
costs include fines, recalls, and class action suits, all of 
which can be manipulated by regulators and buyers to 
mitigate moral hazard.  Indirect failure costs can also 
be controlled, but by fining an industry, for example, 
many innocent producers will pay a portion of the 
costs generated by one unsafe producer. 
Production costs.  Production costs offer significant 
opportunity to mitigate moral hazard.  By subsidizing 
the production of safe food the incremental cost 
declines and condition (8) is more likely to hold.   
Government support for safe food production 
technology could have a meaningful impact on the 
safety of the food supply. 
In conclusion, our analysis reveals that 
inefficiencies in the traceability system significantly 
impact the existence of moral hazard in the food 
supply chain.  The existence of moral hazard 
influences the incentive to produce safe food.  High 
traceback error means there is less of incentive to 
produce safer food and low traceback error supports 
the production of safe food.  Under certain 
circumstances, traceback efficiency is irrelevant with 
respect to the supplier’s incentive to produce safe 
food.  Regulators who wish to manipulate the terms of 
trade in order to mitigate moral hazard should focus 
their attention on the cost of producing safe food, the 
sampling and traceback error, and the cost of direct 
failures.  These parameters have the greatest potential 
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